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SERVITUDES REFORM AND THE NEW
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY: CREATION
DOCTRINES AND STRUCTURAL
SIMPLIFICATION
Susan F. Frencht
Servitudes provide the means to tie rights and obligations to
land ownership or occupancy so that, without any further agreement, successors to the land take it with the benefits and burdens of
the servitude arrangement. By using servitudes, land owners can
make permanent changes in the default allocations of rights and obligations to their land. Used extensively today in residential and
commercial development, as well as for transportation and natural
resource exploitation, servitudes are a central contribution to the
world of private ordering.
The concept of interests running with the land is elegantly simple, but the law governing servitude devices is a mess. I have described it previously as "the most complex and archaic body of
American property law remaining in the twentieth century."'
Others have described it more colorfully "as an unspeakable quagmire," 2 "confounding intellectual experiences," 3 and an area of the
law full of "rigid categories, silly distinctions, and unreconciled conflicts over basic values." 4 George Lefcoe went so far as to say that
"[s]ince the first English case interpreting the first English statute
on the subject, commentators have doubted that the courts understood the law, and a study of judicial opinions, from Spencer's Case
on, is bewildering at best." 5
Ultimately, the complexity in servitudes law is due to courts'
view that unchecked enforcement of servitudes is dangerous. From
the beginning, courts have controlled servitude use by refusing to
enforce a variety of arrangements freely entered into by land owners
and occupiers. 6 Without such judicial controls, servitudes law could
t
I

Professor of Law, University of California, Davis.

French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL.

L. REV. 1261 (1982).
2

3

E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 480 (2d ed. 1982).
Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Homes Associations: A New Perspective, 123 U. PA. L.

REV. 711, 717 (1975).
4 C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAw 909 (2d ed. 1985).
5 G. LEFCOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW 768-69 (2d ed. 1974) (footnote omitted).

6

Both Roman and English law refused to permit servitudes that imposed affirma-
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be very simple. As Richard Epstein has suggested, it could consist
of one rule with two exceptions: enforce the servitude arrangement
as agreed to by the parties, except against successors without notice
7
and except where the arrangement is illegal.
A secondary cause of the complexity in servitudes law is that the
judicial controls have evolved in true common law fashion over
many centuries." To escape controls that had become too restrictive, lawyers cast transactions in different forms and drew arguments
from different areas of the law. Judges accommodated the demands
for development by accepting these new forms and arguments, and
by designing or using new types of controls made available by developments in other areas of the law. However, the old forms and controls did not disappear, and as the old continued alongside the new,
the gradually accreting layers of doctrine became ever more
complex.
The earliest forms of control were bright-line and categorical,
like the prohibitions on holding benefits in gross and on placing affirmative burdens on the land owner. Later, when affirmative burdens were permitted, another categorical control, the horizontal
privity requirement, restricted their use to lease transactions. Gradually, the law developed more open-ended controls, like the touch
and concern and the changed conditions doctrines. Since the midnineteenth century, 9 servitudes law has evolved from primary relitive burdens or created benefits in gross. M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 144-45 (3d ed.

1980); Sturley, The "Land Obligation". An English Proposalfor Reform, 55 S. CAL. L. REv.
1417, 1428-29 (1982).
American courts have refused to enforce a variety of servitude arrangements. Two
recent cases from New York illustrate the point. In Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 69
N.Y.2d 570, 509 N.E.2d 309, 516 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1987), the court refused to enforce an
easement because it had been created in the same instrument which conveyed the servient estate to another. In Eagle Enters., Inc. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 349 N.E.2d 816,
384 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1976), the same court refused to enforce an agreement in which a
landowner agreed to buy water from a particular water company.
7
Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Seroitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv.
1353 (1982).
8 Servitudes law has ancient roots. Rights of way appear in the Twelve Tables of
Rome. W. BUCKLAND, THE MAIN INsTrrtUONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 152 (1931).
Later Roman law recognized a variety of land use servitudes that we would classify as
easements and profits. They included rights of way, rights to draw and conduct water,
dig gravel, pasture cattle, burn lime, discharge water, and to encroach on a neighbor's
airspace, as well as rights to light, view, and support. W. BuCKLAND, A MANUAL OF RoMAN PRrVATE LAW 155-57 (2d ed. 1947). English law recognized running covenant benefits as early as Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Edw. 3, fo. 3, pl. 14 (1368) (also known as
Prior's Case) and running covenant burdens in Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep.
72 (Q.B. 1583). For the record of Pakenham's Case, see Woodbine, Pakenham's Case, 38
YALE L.J. 775 (1929).
9 The mid-nineteenth century marked a major milestone with development of the
equitable servitude which eliminated the horizontal privity requirement. The leading
cases in England and the United States were Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige Ch. 351 (N.Y.

930

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:928

ance on ex ante, categorical controls to primary reliance on ex post,
open-ended controls. This evolution is nearly complete, but husks
of the old ex ante controls remain, generating the clutter and confusion of current servitudes law.
The American Law Institute's new servitudes restatement project' 0 is designed to shake servitudes law free from the old controls
and forms, and to restate the law as a coherent integrated body of
doctrine. Although simplification and clarification of the law are its
major goals, 1 the project is not designed to provide the ultimate
simplification that would result from adopting a laissez-faire attitude
toward servitudes. The project is not designed to change the fundamental premise that servitude enforcement must be subject to certain controls imposed by the legal system, but rather, to restate the
law in modern, functional terms. 12
Once the obsolete and unnecessary controls on servitudes are
eliminated, we will be faced with the formidable tasks of setting
forth the doctrinal bases of the remaining controls and of laying the
Ch. 1840); Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige Ch. 254 (N.Y. Ch. 1832); Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774,
41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
10 The Restatement project got underway in the spring of 1986 after I was named
Reporter. As Reporter, I bear the initial responsibility for shaping the Restatement's
form and content, but my work is only the beginning. Under the Institute's procedures,
drafts are submitted first to a group of Advisers, then to the Council, and, after approval
by the Council, to the membership. Only after approval by the membership does a draft
become a Restatement. We are still in the early stages of the servitudes project. As of
this writing, in January 1988, I have met three time with the Advisers to hammer out the
scope and approach of the project, the organizational implications of adopting an integrated approach to servitudes law, and the extent to which we can streamline servitudes
law by eliminating obsolete and unnecessary doctrines and redundant servitude devices.
This Article reflects much of the work that has gone into that process but the conclusions presented here are strictly my own and do not necessarily represent the views of
the Advisers or the Institute.
I am currently working on the chapter on Creation of Servitudes which I hope to
complete in 1988.
11 French, Design Proposalfor the New Restatement of the Law of Property-Servitudes, 21
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1213 (1988).
12
I do not believe that it would be appropriate for a Restatement to make such a
fundamental departure from existing law, even if the departure would be "good."
Fortunately, I do not believe that adoption of a laissez-faire approach would be a
good idea. I disagree with Richard Epstein's contention that the market should or can
be relied on to avert the dangers of unchecked servitude enforcement. See Epstein, supra
note 7. Even if it were possible to force parties to structure their servitudes to provide
long-range flexibility and methods of avoiding hold-out problems-a premise I think
dubious-I would oppose forcing parties into that kind of front-end investment. Of
course, if they do make such an investment, their contract should be given effect; but if
they do not, the law should provide them an alternative, by way of future judicial modification and termination of arrangements that for one reason or another have become
unworkable or counter-productive.
For an excellent discussion of the problems inherent in the laissez-faire approach,
see Sterk, Freedomfrom Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70
IOWA L. REv. 615 (1985).
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groundwork for development of new controls. In the process of examining what controls are needed and where, the restatement will
make an important contribution by identifying dearly the problems
that demand control and the conflicting values involved in determining whether to enforce servitude arrangements.1 3 Much servitudes doctrine was developed by courts that did neither, and some
of the confusion in servitudes law can be blamed on that approach.
The touch and concern doctrine provides a prime example: it identifies neither the problems addressed1 4 nor the value choices that
must be made in determining whether to apply it.
In this Article, I discuss the principles I have followed and the
results I have reached in constructing a simplified doctrinal foundation on which to restructure the law of servitudes. Part I sets out the
basic approach I have taken to simplifying servitudes law. Part II
discusses the old doctrines that limit servitude creation and the reasons why they can be eliminated. Part III discusses the traditional
servitude categories and the differences that remain among them after the old limiting doctrines are eliminated; based on that discussion, I propose a taxonomy for a modernized servitudes law. Part
IV sets forth my concept of how to restate the law of servitudes as an
integrated body of doctrine. The Appendix contains my current
working outline of an integrated servitudes law.
I
SIMPLIFYING THE LAW OF SERVITUDES

In setting about the task of simplifying the law of servitudes, I
started from the proposition that servitude arrangements should be
enforceable unless there is a demonstrable reason to the contrary. 15
As I wrote in the Design Proposal for the Restatement:
The shift from judicial control of servitude dangers by cate13
Servitude enforcement sometimes pits strongly-held values against one another.
Values of freedom of contract, freedom from dead-hand control, values of freedom of
association and freedom from discrimination, values of autonomy in choice of lifestyle,
freedom from restraints on trade and alienation, and democratic values may all be challenged by servitude enforcement. Cleaning up the old doctrinal tangle should enable us
to see more clearly the real questions posed by servitude enforcement and to address
them more directly.
14 Why does it matter whether a covenant burden or benefit touches and concerns
the land? We are never told. The major contribution of recent scholarship in the servitudes field is to penetrate the old doctrines to explore the possible functions they serve.
My own contribution to that effort can be found in French, supra note 1; citations to the
works of others can be found id. at 1262 n.3. Since I wrote this Article, Professor Stake
has essayed an economic defense of the touch and concern doctrine Stake, Toward an
Economic Understandingof Touch and Concern, DUKE LJ. (forthcoming November 1988).
15 The old ex ante restrictions on servitude creation have given way sufficiently to
make this a justifiable starting point. The analysis that led me to this conclusion is set
forth in French, supra note 1.
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gorical limits on the types of servitudes that can be created and
the transactions in which they can be created permits a major shift
in attitude toward servitudes.... [People] should be able to create any servitudes they find useful. The basic approach of the law
should be to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.
If what is intended violates constitutional or statutory norms or
doctrines expressing public policy, the arrangement should be declared invalid. If the servitude arrangement is valid, it should be
permitted to bind successors and continue until it becomes obso16
lete or unduly burdensome.
From this proposition, I derived two basic principles. First, no
doctrine restricting the creation of a servitude should be retained
unless it can be justified by current or future needs, or unless it is a
doctrine of general application. 17 Second, servitude doctrines addressing particular problems should give way to doctrines of more
general application that satisfactorily address the same problem.
The Statute of Frauds and the recording acts, for example, provide
satisfactory solutions to problems addressed by earlier servitude
doctrines requiring writings and notice, and should displace them.
As I demonstrate in Part II, none of the old servitude-specific doctrines restricting creation of servitude arrangements survive application of these two principles.
A third major principle I have followed in simplifying and restructuring the law of servitudes is that the same rule should apply
to all servitudes unless there is a demonstrable reason why different
rules should apply.' 8 After applying all these principles, several of
the traditional servitude classifications become redundant and can
be eliminated, as I show in Part III.
There are two final principles that I have tried to follow in proposing to retain certain servitude classifications and doctrines.
First, the language of a restated law of servitudes should reflect the
normal usage of lawyers and judges to the extent this is consistent
with the project's other goals. 19 Second, the problems created by
French, supra note 11, at 122 1.
By doctrines of general application I mean doctrines that restrict creation of
other arrangements as well as servitudes, such as prohibitions of unreasonable restraints
on trade and alienation, and prohibitions of racial discrimination.
16
17

Application of this principle leads to the conclusions that the horizontal privity requirement should be eliminated but that the Statute of Fraud's writing requirement
should not; likewise, that the prohibition of benefits in gross should be eliminated but
the prohibition of unreasonable restraints on alienation and of racial discrimination
should not.
18 Professor Lawrence Berger has pointed out a number of areas where differences
among servitudes do justify applying different rules. Berger, Integrationof the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337 (1986).
19 For example, I have chosen to use the word "covenant" rather than the phrase
"promises respecting the use of land" not only because it is shorter but also because it
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servitude arrangements should be stated as clearly as possible and
doctrinal solutions should tackle them as directly as possible. The
touch and concern doctrine is a prime offender of this principle. I
believe courts should retain their discretionary power to terminate
servitude arrangements if enforcement would be harmful. 20 However, I firmly believe that courts should state why the enforcement
would be harmful, rather than hide behind the rubric of touch and
concern.
II
ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY CONSTRAINTS
ON SERVITUDE CREATION

Depending on how you count, American law recognizes between five and fourteen different servitude devices. The primary
categories are profits, easements, irrevocable licenses, real covenants, and equitable servitudes. Additional categories result from
classifying benefits and burdens as appurtenant or in gross, and as
negative or affirmative. While there are some functional differences
among these various devices, many are equivalents because they were
developed to circumvent controls imposed on others, rather than to
meet demands for different types of arrangements. 2 ' If the unnecessary servitude control doctrines are eliminated and the same rules
are applied to all servitudes, except where there are real differences
among them, then several servitude categories can be eliminated as
redundant.
In this Part, I will present the old doctrines limiting creation of
servitudes that I think can be eliminated: horizontal privity, limits
on third party beneficiaries, prohibitions of affirmative burdens,
touch and concern, seal and writing requirements apart from the
Statute of Frauds, notice requirements in addition to the recording
acts, and prohibitions of benefits in gross. I conclude with what I
think should be the requirements continuing to govern the creation
of servitudes.
reflects normal usage. I have dropped the term "equitable servitude" even though it
reflects normal usage, however, because it leads to confusion in a world where there are
no actual differences between actual covenants and equitable servitudes.
20 This is the effect of the touch and concern doctrine. Although it is stated as an
ex ante control-that the burden or benefit will not run unless it touches and concerns-the doctrine is so vague that it in fact tends to terminate servitude arrangements.
Except when faced with a few settled covenants like mortgage covenants, courts can
characterize easily a covenant as one which does or does not touch and concern land.
This characterization is generally made after the fact when the covenant's long range
effects have become apparent. See generally infra pages 21-23.
21
Equitable servitudes, for example, circumvent both the purpose limitations im-

posed on negative easements and the privity requirements imposed on negative
covenants.
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Horizontal Privity

The horizontal privity requirement applies only to real covenants. In its original English form, 22 it restricted the use of real cov23
enants to lease transactions. As developed in the United States,
the relationships creating horizontal privity expanded until a real
covenant could be created in any transaction involving conveyance
24
of some other interest in land.
In this American form, the only possible function of the horizontal privity requirement is to insure that covenants appear in recordable instruments. 25 This function is more simply served by the
22
R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 742-43 (4th ed. 1975).
Tenurial privity is rarely required in the United States. In McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W. Va.
395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1943), the court purported to adhere to the English view but also
cited with apparent approval several West Virginia cases that had found sufficient privity
in the conveyance of a right of way or fee in the burdened land.
23
The first expansion of the English rule in the United States occurred in Massachusetts. The "Massachusetts Rule" added to the persons enjoying a relationship sufficient to create horizontal privity the owners of the benefit and burden of an easement.
Hurd v. Curtis, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 459 (1837); Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 449
(1837). This type of privity is variously called "simultaneous," "substituted," "mutual,"
or "continuing" privity. 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 673[2][c], at n.104 (1986);
Note, Covenants Running With the Land: Viable Doctrine or Common-Law Relic?, 7 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 139, 145 n.36 (1978).
The rule may have lost its force in Massachusetts. In Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 390 N.E.2d 243 (1979), an action to enforce a covenant not to permit
the grantor's retained land to be used in competition with the discount store of the
grantee, the court stated that the deed granted mutual easements sufficient to satisfy the
requirement that the parties be in privity of estate. The opinion states that the deed
contained numerous, detailed reciprocal restrictions and covenants designed to assure
the harmonious development of a shopping center but does not specifically mention any
easements. One commentary suggests that this seriously undercuts Hurd and Morse,
although the court may not have intended that result, or may have intended to limit it to
reciprocal covenants. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, PROPERTY 479
(1984).
24
See, e.g., Carlson v. Libby, 137 Conn. 362, 77 A.2d 332 (1950) (conditional easement); Albright v. Fish, 136 Vt. 387, 394 A.2d 1117 (1978) (warranty deed). This type
of privity is sometimes called "instantaneous" privity. Browder, Running Covenants and
Public Policy, 77 MIcH. L. REV. 12, 21 (1978). Contra, Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204
(1871) (no privity of estate between owners of adjacent mill sites even though one party
had conveyed the mill site to the other only six days earlier).
25 Requiring the simultaneous grant of an estate tends to insure that the covenant
will be included in a deed but serves no other apparent function. It imposes no durational limit on running covenant burdens and no practical limit on transaction costs.
Since a covenant can be imposed in the conveyance of a fee interest in the property,
there is no assurance that the original parties or their successors will have any continuing contact with each other or any shared economic incentives to keep the burdened
property productive.
The English horizontal privity requirement, limiting affirmative covenants to those
created in leases, performs at least two functions: First, it increases the likelihood that a
successor to the covenantor will receive notice of the obligation. Second, it limits the
covenant burden's potential to make the property unmarketable or unproductive by limiting transaction costs, requiring that both parties have economic interests in continued
productivity of the burdened land, and tending to assure that the covenants have limited
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Statute of Frauds and the recording acts. Since the doctrine has little support in modern case law2 6 and none among scholars of servitudes law, 2 7 its elimination should not prove controversial.
life. French, supra note 1, at 1292-93. The Massachusetts privity rule also tends to limit
the transaction costs of modifying or terminating covenants but does not provide the
same protection against obsolete or uneconomic covenant burdens because the economic well-being of the parties is not necessarily intertwined and the life of the covenant
is not limited.
26 See, e.g., Roche v. Ullman, 104I1. 11 (1882); Pillsbury v. Morris, 54 Minn. 492,56
N.W. 170 (1893); Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co., 30 Minn. 179, 183, 14 N.W. 874, 875
(1883); Reichert v. Weeden, 618 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Mont. 1980); Bolles v. Pecos Irrigation Co., 23 N.M. 32, 38, 167 P. 280, 283 (1917); Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640, 20 A. 706
(1890); Newman & Losey, Covenants Running with the Land and Equitable Servitudes; Two
Concepts, or One?, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1319, 1328-29 (1970).
The Field Civil Code, adopted in California, Montana, and a few other states, appeared to include a horizontal privity requirement for covenants that run with the land.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-203 (1985). California eliminated the horizontal
privity requirement with the enactment of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West 1982), and
Montana appears to have ignored it in the Reichert case.
In New York, the privity requirement has been applied inconsistently. 5 R. POWELL,
supra note 23, 673[2][c], at 60-63 n.113. Now, it appears to have been eliminated.
Orange and Rockland Utils., Inc. v. Philwold Estates, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 253, 263 418
N.E.2d 1310, 437 N.Y.S.2d 291, 295 (1981) ("now the party seeking to enforce the covenant need show only that he held property descendant from the promisee which benefited from the covenant and that the owner of the servient parcel acquired it with notice
of the covenant"). Even those courts that recite horizontal privity as a requirement may
express doubts about its viability, Moseley v. Bishop, 470 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. App. 1984),
or find horizontal privity where it once did not exist, Leighton v. Leonard, 22 Wash.
App. 136, 589 P.2d 279 (1979).
The only recent cases refusing to enforce covenants against successors for lack of
horizontal privity are Johnson v. Myers, 226 Ga. 23, 172 S.E.2d 421 (1970) and Clear
Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 537 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976),
aff'd as modifiedsub nom. Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co, 549 S.W.2d
385 (Tex. 1977). In Muldawer v. Stribling, 243 Ga. 673, 256 S.E.2d 357 (1979), the
court said that it would have denied an injunction against violation of a covenant among
neighbors were it not for an express assumption of the obligation by the successor to the
covenantor. The neighbors were entitled to enforce the assumption agreement as third
party beneficiaries. Refusal to issue an injunction for lack of horizontal privity reflects
English law prior to Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
27
Dean Oliver Rundell, Reporter for the first Restatement of Property Law, Servitudes, was probably the last scholar to mount a serious defense of the horizontal privity
requirement. His insistence on including it in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 534
(1944) sparked an acrimonious debate with Judge Clark. See Clark, The American Law
Institute's Law of Real Covenants, 52 YALE LJ. 699 (1943); Rundell,Judge Clark on the American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants: A Comment, 53 YALE LJ. 312 (1944); Clark,A Note
on Professor Rundell's Comment, 53 YALE LJ. 327 (1944); see also, Sims, The Law of Real
Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement of the Subject by theAmerican Law Institute, 30 CORNELL
L.Q. 1, 30-33 (1944) (although not entirely in accord with Clark, Sims also criticized
Rundell's inclusion of the horizontal privity requirement). Holmes had argued earlier
that there was no historical foundation for the horizontal privity requirement. 0.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 401 (1881).

Professors Berger and Browder are representative of current scholars in viewing the
horizontal privity requirement as useless and absurd. Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises
Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REv. 167, 195 (1970); Browder, Running Covenants
and Public Policy, 77 MICH. L. REv. 12, 25 (1978).
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Third Party Beneficiaries

Some remnants of ancient prohibitions on creating benefits for
strangers-persons who are not immediate parties to the transaction-remain in current servitudes law. 28 In both easement and
covenant law, there are rules prohibiting the grantor of land from
29
creating servitudes to benefit his neighbors or other third parties.
A related limitation in covenant law formerly prevented earlier purchasers in residential subdivisions from enforcing covenants against
later purchasers. 30 These rules prevented intended beneficiaries
from enforcing easement and covenant rights.
Real property law developed partial solutions to these
problems. Easements reserved in favor of third parties were treated
as exceptions to the grantor or as exceptions of pre-existing rights
in third parties.3 1 Development of the general plan doctrine permit28
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.29 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWELL, supra
note 23, 407, at 34-39 to 39-40 (1987).
29
The majority of states still appear to follow the rule that the grantor of an estate
in land cannot reserve or except an easement in favor of a third party. Wessells v. State
Dep't of Highways, 562 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1977) (dictum); Guaranty Loan & Trust Co. v.
Helena Improvement Dist., 148 Ark. 56, 228 S.W. 1045 (1921); Dade County v. Little,
115 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (dictum); Allingham v. Nelson, 6 Kan. App. 2d
294, 627 P.2d 1179 (1981); Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d
1124 (Me. 1984); Fitanides v. Holman, 310 A.2d 65 (Me. 1973); Herbert v. Pue, 72 Md.
307, 20 A. 182 (1890); Hodgkins v. Bianchini, 323 Mass. 169, 80 N.E.2d 464 (1948);
Hazen v. Mathews, 184 Mass. 388, 68 N.E. 838 (1903); but see Haverhill Say. Bank v.
Griffin, 184 Mass. 419, 68 N.E. 839 (1903) (treated as reservation to grantor); Ellison v.
Fellows, 121 N.H. 978, 437 A.2d 278 (1981); Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 69 N.Y.2d
570, 509 N.E.2d 309, 516 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1987); Owen v. Holzheid, 335 Pa. Super. 231,
484 A.2d 107 (1984) (dictum); Lauderbach-Zerby Co. v. Lewis, 283 Pa. 250, 129 A. 83
(1925) (treating reservation as exception of pre-existing rights); Fusaro v. Varrecchione,
51 R.I. 35, 150 A. 462 (1930); Brace v. Van Eps, 21 S.D. 65, 109 N.W. 147 (1906);Joiner
v. Sullivan, 260 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), Guilbault v. Bowley, 146 Vt. 39, 498
A.2d 1033 (1985); Pitman v. Sweeney, 34 Wash. App. 321, 661 P.2d 153 (1983); Simmons v. Northern Pac. R.R., 88 Wash. 384, 153 P. 321 (1915).
Authorities prohibiting the grantor from imposing restrictions on the land conveyed in favor of her neighbors include: Hays v. St. Paul M.E. Church, 196 Ill. 633, 63
N.E 1040 (1902); Brown v. Fuller, 347 A.2d 127 (Me. 1975); S.K. Edwards Hall Co. v.
Dresser, 168 Mass. 136, 46 N.E. 420 (1897); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United
States v. Brennan, 148 N.Y. 661, 43 N.E. 173 (1896); Master v. Hansard 4 Ch. D. 718
(1876); Renals v. Cowlishaw, 9 Ch. D. 125 (1876).
30 See, e.g., Doerr v. Cobbs, 146 Mo. App. 342, 123 S.W. 547 (1909); McNichol v.
Townsend, 73 NJ. Eq. 276, 67 A. 938 (1907); Keates v. Lyon, L.R. 4 Ch. Div. 218
(1869).
31
The reservation in favor of a third party was treated as an exception retained by
the grantor in the following cases: Jackson v. Snodgrass, 140 Ala. 365, 37 So. 246
(1903); School District v. Lynch, 33 Conn. 330 (1866); Deaver v. Aaron, 159 Ga. 597,
126 S.E. 382 (1925), but cf. Harrell v. Harrell 250 Ga. 797, 300 S.E.2d 806 (life estate);
Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 360 P.2d 403 (1961); Cook v. Farley, 195 Miss. 638, 15
So. 2d 352 (1943); Schmidt v. City of Tipton, 89 S.W. 2d 569 (Mo. App. 1936); Burns v.
Bastien, 174 Okla. 40, 50 P.2d 377 (1935).
The reservation in favor of a third party was treated as an exception of pre-existing
rights in the third party in the following cases: Board of County Commrs v. Anderson,
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ted enforcement of subdivision covenants by all lot owners against
all other lots in subdivision. 32 Although they work reasonably well,
these solutions are doctrinally awkward and not completely satisfactory. In the contracts area courts have developed the simpler and
more comprehensive third party beneficiary doctrine 33 which provides a complete theoretical solution to the problem. Since there is
no apparent reason why servitude benefits should not be created
directly in third parties, 34 the third party beneficiary doctrine is now
being carred over into servitudes law, 3 5 where it should supplant the
older doctrines.
34 Colo. App. 37, 525 P.2d 478 (1974) aff'd subnom. Anderson v. Union P.R. Co., 188
Colo. 337, 534 P.2d 1201 (1975); Williams v. Babcock, 121 N.H. 185, 428 A.2d 108
(1981); Tallarico v. Brett, 137 Vt. 52, 400 A.2d 959 (1979); Toussaint v. Stone, 116 Vt.
425, 77 A.2d 824 (1951); Beckley Nat'l Exchange Bank v. Lilly, 116 W. Va. 608, 182 S.E.
767 (1935) (dictum).
A different approach was used in Williams v. Stirling, 40 Colo. App. 463, 583 P.2d
290 (1978), where a reservation of an easement in favor of the grantor was held to create
rights in a third party by virtue of a trust imposed on the grantor because of his fiduciary
relation to the third party.
32 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 28, § 9.30. Bristol v. Woodward, 251
N.Y. 275, 167 N.E. 441 (1929) contains a discussion of the implied reciprocal servitude
theory used to explain the general plan result. See also Sailor v. Podolski, 82 NJ. Eq.
459, 88 A. 967 (1913).
33 The doctrine originated with Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). See 4 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 772-855 (1951 & Supp. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 14 (1981).
34 Cases in a growing minority ofjurisdiction recognize that easements may be directly created in third parties. Willard v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 7 Cal. 3d 473,
498 P.2d 987, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1972); Application of Kelley, 50 Haw. 567, 445 P.2d
538 (1968); Enderle v. Sharman, 422 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Townsend v.
Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1964); Mott v. Stanlake, 63 Mich. App. 440, 234 N.W.2d
667 (1975) (assumed to have been an exception to benefit a third party, not a reservation, since an exception to benefit a third party is permissible); Medhus v. Dutter, 184
Mont. 437, 603 P.2d 669 (1979) (intent to create easement in stranger must be clearly
shown); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 210 NJ. Super. 127, 509 A.2d 252
(1986); Zurn Indus., Inc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 33 Ohio App. 3d 59, 514 N.E.2d 447
(1986); Hollosy v. Gershkowitz, 88 Ohio App. 199, 98 N.E.2d 314 (1950); Garza v. Grayson, 255 Or. 413, 467 P.2d 960 (1970); Badger State Agri-Credit & Realty, Inc. v.
Lubahn, 122 Wis. 2d 718, 365 N.W.2d 616 (1985); Simpson v. Kistler Investment Co.,
713 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 1986). RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 472 (1944) rejected the
common law prohibition and recognized creation of an easement in a third person if the
deed adequately expressed the grantor's intent.
35 See, e.g., Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 832,
196 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1959) (affirmative covenant); Vogeler v. Alwyn Improvement Corp.,
247 N.Y. 131, 136-37, 159 N.E. 886, 888 (1928) (restrictive covenant); Snow v. Van
Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1935); Rodgers v. Reimann, 227 Or. 62, 361 P.2d
101 (1961).
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 541 (1944) adopts third party beneficiary theory to explain enforcement of subdivision covenants against prior grantees. Section 472
reaches the same result with respect to easements but not on third party beneficiary
grounds. It simply states that a single instrument of conveyance can create an estate in
one person and an easement in another without stating a theoretical basis for the departure from the old rule. Id. at § 472.
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Prohibitions of Affirmative Burdens

Roman law refused to recognize land servitudes that imposed
affirmative burdens on the landowner.3 6 English law contained the
same restriction but created a category of "spurious easements" to
37
accommodate obligations to maintain fences and common walls.
Real covenants were permitted to impose affirmative burdens but
were restricted to lease covenants by the horizontal privity requirement. After elimination of the horizontal privity requirement for
enforcement of covenants in equity, it appeared that affirmative covenant obligations created outside of leases or the spurious easement
categories would be enforceable. However, by the late nineteenth
century, English law determined that affirmative burdens would not
38
be enforced in equity.
Because American law broadened the horizontal privity requirement so that most land transactions could meet it, courts did
not develop the concept of spurious easements. Real covenant doctrine met the demand for most affirmative obligations. However, as
affirmative covenants have became more common in residential subdivisions, some demand has arisen for enforcement of affirmative
covenants in equity. It is doubtful that the English rule prohibiting
affirmative burdens in equitable servitudes was ever in force in this
country, but if it was, recent cases are disclaiming it.39 Since the
horizontal privity rule has no force in this country, there is no reason to maintain a rule that would permit enforcement of affirmative
40
burdens as covenants but not as equitable servitudes.
Enforcement of affirmative burdens as servitudes does raise
some concerns about the possibilities for impairing the marketability of land, the same concerns that probably led to development of
the English rule restricting the transactions in which they could be
imposed to leases. American law cannot deal effectively with these
concerns in the same way that English law did because it has eliminated the horizontal privity requirement. Instead, the touch and
concern doctrine has been used to address these concerns, and they
will be further discussed in connection with that doctrine.

36

M. KASER, supra note 6, at 119.

37

Sturley, supra note 6, at 1429 n.92.
Haywood v. Brunswick Bldg. Soc'y, 8 Q.B.D. 403 (1881).
Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 NJ. Super. 155, 283 A.2d 911 (1971); Fitz-

38

39
stephens v. Watson, 218 Or. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959).

40 There is no reason why easements should not be used to impose affirmative burdens either, except usage. As discussed below, I favor retaining both covenants and
easements as descriptions of servitude devices so I will not pursue the idea of using
easements to impose affirmative obligations on land owners.
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Touch and Concern

The touch and concern doctrine has traditionally been stated in
the form of an ex ante limit on the creation of servitudes. 4 1 If the
benefit or burden of the covenant does not touch or concern the
land, then it does not run with the land. As it applies to benefits, I
continue to regard the requirement as such an ex ante control, and I
have treated it as a prohibition on benefits in gross. 42 As it applies
to burdens, however, I think the touch and concern requirement is
more in the nature of an ex post control, operating after the fact to
give the court a discretionary power to terminate a servitude. The
concept is so difficult to pin down that it can rarely be used as a basis
for predicting the enforceability of a particular covenant. Each covenant must be litigated to determine whether it touches and concerns or not.
To the extent that the burden side of the touch and concern
requirement does operate as a limit on covenant creation, I propose
that it be eliminated along with the other old ex ante controls. Its
only significant operation is in the realm of affirmative covenants,
where it serves to prevent the creation of particular types of covenants. Why it prevents them, however, remains a mystery. Some
have suggested that it only prevents creation of covenant obligations that people would expect not to be bound by if they bought
the land.43 But why would they expect not to be bound? If there is
notice of the covenant, and the intent that it run is dear, the only
basis for such an expectation is precedent.
When a court invalidates a covenant obligation on the ground
that it does not touch and concern the land, it makes a substantive
judgment that the obligation should not be permitted to run with
land. 44 Such judgments have been passed with respect to mortgage
The doctrine is sometimes treated under the heading of succession rather than
creation. I prefer to treat it as a matter of creation, however, because unless some interest runs with land there is no servitude.
42
Although there is some mushiness in the question whether a benefit touches and
concerns land if the arrangement benefits a business, I view the appurtenance requirement as relatively clear-cut. It is usually not difficult to tell whether a covenant is intended to run with an interest in land or to be held by a person or business
independently of any interest in the land owned or occupied by the covenantee at the
time the covenant was made.
43 See Berger, supra note 27.
44
Reichman essentially takes the same view, although he expresses it as exercising
a power to fix the boundaries of servitudes and apparently is not troubled by permitting
courts to exercise this power without articulating what they are doing or why. In his
view, "[t]his somewhat unusual interventionist theory is justified because the permanent
attachment to land of merely personal obligations is likely to frustrate the objectives of a
private land holding system." Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Seroitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1177, 1233 (1982).
However, in explaining what he means, Reichman expresses the concern that obli41
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covenants, a variety of lease covenants, and a few other covenants.
The real reasons for the invalidation are seldom, if ever, given.
Sometimes it appears that the covenant restrains trade or competition;4 5 sometimes it appears that the covenant takes unfair advantage of a consumer; 4 6 sometimes it simply appears that conditions
have changed and the agreement no longer produces the benefits
47
that the original covenantor expected.
In my view, servitudes law should separate initial-validity questions from modification and termination questions, and should
tackle both directly. The vice of the touch and concern doctrine is
that it permits commingling of the two types of questions and treats
both behind such a screen of hocus-pocus that we have to guess at
the reasons for a decision. It is often difficult to know whether the
arrangement was invalidated because it violated some important
public policy, or whether it was terminated because it was unfair in
the beginning or had become obsolete or unduly burdensome later
on.
We will make a major advance in improving the quality of servitudes law if we abandon the rhetoric of touch and concern. Servitudes law should address separately and directly the questions
whether an arrangement would violate a constitutional, statutory, or
public policy norm if permitted to operate as a servitude, and
whether the arrangement, while valid as a servitude, should be terminated because it has become obsolete, unduly burdensome, or
something else.
E.

Formalities Required to Create Servitudes

In an earlier era, the law distinguished between the writing requirements imposed by the Statute of Frauds and those that existed
independently because they predated the Statute. Some importance
was also given to the question whether a seal might still be required
gations not related to actual property use tend to become inefficient but may be difficult
to terminate because of transaction costs and that servitude obligations might be used to
create modem variations of feudal serfdom. Id.
45 See, e.g., Eagle Enters., Inc. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 349 N.E.2d 816, 384
N.Y.S.2d 717 (1976); Clear Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 537 S.W.2d
48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), aff'd as modified sub. nom. Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear
Lake Utils. Co., 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977). In both cases the courts permitted land
owners to escape from covenant obligations to buy water from a particular source after a
cheaper or better water supply became available from another source. In neither case
did the court justify the loss to what would appear to have been investment-backed expectations of the covenantee water companies involved. It is possible that the courts
viewed the initial contracts as extortionate or believed the investments well repaid but
they do not say so.
46
See French, supra note 1, at 1290-92.
47 See, e.g., Eagle Enters. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 349 N.E.2d 816, 384 N.Y.S.2d
717 (1976).

1988]

SERVITUDES REFORM

941

to create a valid easement or covenant. Today, it seems obvious
that all servitudes should be treated as interests in land subject to
the conveyancing sections of the Statute of Frauds and that seals are
obsolete. I would not expect this position to be controversial.
F. Notice
Equitable servitude doctrine traditionally has stated notice as a
requirement for creation. In this it differs from all the other servitude devices, particularly covenants. Although the distinction was
significant in England because that country had no adequate recording system, it has meant little in the United States. Despite variations in wording, American recording statutes everywhere should
protect the unknowing against unrecorded servitudes of all types. 48
I cannot think of any reason to give more protection against equitable servitudes than against other kinds of servitudes.
The only place where a notice requirement in addition to recordation conceivably could make a difference is to protect a donee, or
to protect a purchaser in a race-notice jurisdiction who bought
before recordation of the servitude but recorded her deed after recordation of the servitude. It seems obvious that it would not make
sense to protect such purchasers or donees of property burdened by
an equitable servitude while refusing to extend the same protection
to the purchaser or donee of land burdened by a real covenant,
easement, or profit. The same rule should apply to all: they are all
entitled to the protection of the recording acts, but no more.
G. Prohibition of Benefits in Gross
The law once generally refused to recognize the creation of servitude rights in gross. Prohibitions on creating benefits in gross appear in Roman'law as well as in English law, where the prohibition
has survived, at least nominally, into modem times. 49 American law
has cast off the limitation with respect to easements, but retains
50
remnants of it with respect to covenants and equitable servitudes.
American case law is not consistent in applying prohibitions on benefits in gross and does not provide any compelling basis for retain48
Servitudes that leave visible marks on the burdened land would be excepted in
most states because inspection of the premises would give notice.
49
See supra note 6. Although English common law has refused to recognize easements in gross, Parliament has created a host of statutory easements in gross for railroads, pipelines, and the like. It has also granted local authorities powers to enforce
restrictive covenants under some circumstances, a power the courts had denied in
London County Council v. Allen, 3 K.B. 642 [1914]. Sturley, supra note 6, at 1423.
50 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTy, supra note 28, § 9.13, at 375-76; R. CUNNINGHAM,
W. STOEBUCK & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 23, § 8.2.
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ing such a restriction in a modem law of servitudes. 51

In determining whether the remnants of the prohibition should
be retained or discarded, we must look at the functions performed
by the prohibition. The prohibition may be invoked in several different situations, and its role may vary in each. 5 2 In discussing the
51 See Roberts, Promises Respecting Land Use-Can Benefits Be Held in Gross?, 51 Mo. L.
REV. 933 (1986) for a recent extensive treatment of the subject.
52
First, conservation and historic preservation servitudes will normally be held in
gross unless local law forces acquisition of an anchor parcel. Anchor parcels were used
in creating scenic easements under the highway beautification program. Cunningham,
Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program, 45 DEN. LJ. 168 (1968). Statutes
have been enacted in many jurisdictions to avoid the common law strictures against benefits in gross. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 815-16 (West 1982).
Second, governmental bodies may acquire servitude interests for a variety of purposes. See, e.g., Park Redlands Covenant Control Comm. v. Simon, 181 Cal. App. 3d 87,
226 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1986) (for waivers of violations of density restrictions in exchange
for covenants to restrict number and age of occupants); Inhabitants of Middlefield v.
Church Mills Knitting Co., 160 Mass. 267, 35 N.E. 780 (1894) (for exchange of right to
build a dam that would flood out existing bridge maintained by town for covenant to
build and maintain new bridge for benefit of town); Wilmurt v. McGrane, 16 A.D. 412,
45 N.Y.S. 32 (1897) (for waivers of violations of density restrictions in exchange for
covenants not to build in certain areas);Johnson v. State, 27 Or. App. 581, 556 P.2d 724
(1976) (for preventing development of lands intended for future public uses).
Third, covenants in restraint of trade and competition generally are upheld against
challenges that their benefits are in gross even though the benefit is to the business,
rather than the land, of the covenantee. See, e.g., Trosper v. Shoemaker, 312 Ky. 344,
227 S.W.2d 176 (1949); Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 97-99, 390
N.E.2d 243, 246-50 (1979); Staebler-Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, Inc., 329 Mich.
351, 45 N.W.2d 316 (1951); Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955), aff'd,
101 N.H. 48, 132 A.2d 142 (1950); Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power
Gasoline Corp., 41 A.D.2d 950, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30 appeal dismissed, 33 N.Y.2d 656, 348
N.Y.S.2d 980, 303 N.E.2d 705 (1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Klock Produce Co., 85 Or. 403,
414-16, 166 P. 955, 958 (1917); Ball v. Rio Grande Canal Co., 256 S.W. 678 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1923).
Fourth, party wall cases can also involve benefits in gross if the subsequent user is
required to pay the original builder of the wall a share of the construction expense. A
leading case is Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166, 26 N.E. 198 (1885) (holding that the
burden runs even though the benefit is in gross). Clark strongly approved its result,
where consistent with the parties' intentions. C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER
INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 150-51 (2d ed. 1947).
Finally, the benefit of covenants in residential neighborhoods usually run to other
lots in the neighborhood but occasional in gross problems arise where enforcement
rights are given to a property owners' association that owns no land, the developer retains enforcement rights after selling all lots, or an individual grantor imposes a restrictionand then seeks to enforce it after moving away. The property owners' association is
normally permitted to enforce covenants despite holding the benefit in gross. See e.g.,
Merrionette Manor Homes Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, I I Ill. App. 2d 186, 192, 136
N.E.2d 556, 559 (1956); Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indust. Say.
Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 reh'g denied, 278 N.Y. 704, 16 N.E.2d 852 (1938).
The developer, too, should be able to enforce covenants after selling out if intended to
be able to do so. See, e.g., Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Bancroft, 209 Mass. 217, 223,
95 N.E. 216, 219 (1911); Christiansen v. Casey, 613 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
If the individual grantor intended to retain enforcement rights after moving away
she, too, should be able to exercise them, although, in this case, she should probably be
required to show some damage from the violation or other legitimate interest in the
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kinds of cases in which it may be used, I have laid aside the cases
where it is not clear who the intended beneficiary is or whether the
benefit is intended to be appurtenant or in gross. Those are questions of interpretation, not questions of the strictures imposed on
53
permitted servitudes.
Assuming, then, that the intended beneficiary is clear, three
types of cases may arise. In the first, all intended beneficiaries of the
covenant are holders in gross. 54 In the second, the intended beneficiaries include both holders in gross and holders appurtenant. 5 5 In
the third, all intended benefits are appurtenant to land. 56 Application of the prohibition produces different effects in the three cases.
In the first, it gives the holder of the burdened property power to
terminate the arrangement at will, disregarding the intended servitude obligation. In the second, it reduces the group of people entitled to enforce the servitude to the appurtenant holders. In the
third, it has no effect because no in gross rights were created. In
enforcement. Courts have refused enforcement in this situation, usually without addressing the question whether the grantor has a legitimate interest in enforcement after
parting with the land. See, e.g., Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1958);
Genung v. Harvey, 79 N.J. Eq. 57, 80 A. 955 (1911); Graham v. Beermunder, 93 A.D.2d
254, 462 N.Y.S.2d 231 appeal denied in part, dismissed in part, 60 N.Y.2d 630, 467 N.Y.S.2d
353, 454 N.E.2d 936 (1983); Stegall v. Housing Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824
(1971). Contra, Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913). See 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY, supra note 28, § 9.32; Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A
Policy Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. REv. 433,
474 (1984) (arguing that Van Sant v. Rose need not be read to take the position that the
covenantee should be able to enjoin violation of a covenant without regard to damage);
Stone, The EquitableRights and Liabilitiesof Strangers To A Contract, 18 COLUM. L. REv. 291,
313 (1918).
53
Similarly, the question whether a developer retains enforcement rights in subdivision covenants after selling out all lots in the development may be a question of interpretation of the covenants rather than a question as to the developer's power. The only
question that concerns us here is the developer's power to retain enforcement rights
after disposing of her land in the area.
54 For example, the owner of a service station covenants to purchase all gasoline to
be sold on the premises from the covenantee, an oil distributor. The agreement clearly
states that the benefit of the covenant is not intended to run with land of the oil distributor and that the burden is intended to run with the land of the covenantor. As another
example, the owner of wild land covenants with a conservation organization not to develop the property. The agreement states that the benefit is not intended to run with
land of the organization and the burden is intended to run with the land of the
covenantor.
55
For example, subdivision covenants impose building restrictions. The declaration clearly states that all lot owners and the developer are intended to have enforcement rights and that the developer's rights are to continue after all the lots have been
sold.
56 For example, subdivision restrictions provide that the benefits run to all lots in
the subdivision and that the developer retains no enforcement rights after it no longer
owns land in the subdivision. As another example, the seller of a view lot imposes a
restriction to protect the view from a neighboring lot owned by someone else. The deed
provides that the benefit runs to the neighboring lot and the grantor retains no enforcement rights.
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both of the first two cases, the prohibition operates to frustrate the
intent of the original parties.
The traditional justification advanced for continuing to apply
this ancient prohibition on benefits in gross is that it frees land from
obligations, thus promoting free alienability. 5 7 Several assumptions
underlie this justification. The basic assumptions are that servitude
obligations interfere with alienability of land, and that this is a bad
thing. The further assumptions are either that benefits in gross hinder alienability more than benefits appurtenant or that the benefit to
other land from appurtenant servitudes counterbalances the harm
of the servitude. The traditional justification does not take into account the interference with freedom of contract occasioned by the
prohibition, which is also a bad thing. 58
At this level of abstraction, it is difficult to assess the reality and
gravity of the claims that servitudes interfere with alienability and
that servitudes in gross are worse than others. But even if we accept
for the moment the claim that servitudes in gross do interfere to an
unacceptable extent with alienability of land, we must ask whether
the prohibition is effective. The prohibition will be effective only if
the transaction cannot be restructured to avoid it, or if such restructuring would be prohibitively expensive.
The prohibition on benefits in gross does not apply to easements 59 or to defeasible fees. If either of these forms is appropriate

to the transaction, the prohibition can be avoided. 60 Even if the covenant form must be used, there are several alternative ways to avoid
the prohibition. One is to include an additional covenant obligating
the burdened party, upon any conveyance of the land, to extract a
new covenant for the benefit of the original parties from his
57
"If the burden of a promise runs with land, the freedom of alienation of that land
is to some extent restricted. The resulting restriction is permitted only when there is a
countervailing benefit in the use of either the burdened land or of some other land."
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 543 comment c (1944).
58 Recent scholarship recognizes the tension between interests in maintaining
alienability of land and in permitting private ordering by consensual arrangements. See,
e.g., Korngold, supra note 52, at 448-50; Roberts, supra note 51, at 936-38; Sterk, supra
note 12, at 616-17.
59 Whether it applies to negative easements is not absolutely clear. There is very
little authority on the question.
60
Using defeasible fees will not be an effective alternative in many cases because
courts increasingly treat them as covenants. See Jost, The Defeasible Fee and the Birth of the
Modern Residential Subdivision, 49 Mo. L. REv. 695, 731 (1984).
If the prohibition on benefits in gross does not apply to negative easements-a
doubtful proposition-the easement form could be substituted for restrictive covenants.
Whether this would work would also depend on whether the ancient purpose limitations
on negative easements had been lifted. For restrictive covenants, it probably is safer to
acquire an anchor parcel to which the benefits can be tied.
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grantee. 6 ' Another is to use a long-term lease instead of a fee conveyance, tying the benefit to the reversion. 62 Finally, in some cases,
it will be possible to acquire an anchor parcel to which the benefit
63
can be tied.
Using these methods, it appears that in most cases the prohibition on benefits in gross can be circumvented with relative ease.
Before concluding that the prohibition should be eliminated, however, we need to inquire whether the utility of forcing the transactions into these other molds outweighs the transaction and
frustration costs of doing so.
If the prohibition does not apply to negative easements and if
the use of negative easements is not limited to providing light, air,
support, and water in artificial streams, 6 4 then there is no utility to
the prohibition as it applies to restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes. Without those purpose limitations on negative easements, 65 the three devices are fungible. For the prohibition to have
any utility, it must be applied to negative easements as well. For the
balance of this discussion, let us assume that it is.
Turning first to the alternative of forcing parties to acquire
anchor parcels to which the benefits of servitudes can be tied, what
utility does it have? If the benefit holder is the owner of an identified parcel of land, then she can be identified (and probably located)
through the land records. If the property is taxable, the demise or
disappearance of the owner will eventually provoke a tax sale which
66
will again produce an identifiable and locatable benefit holder.
The importance of having identifiable and locatable benefit holders
lies in enabling the party owning the burdened land to negotiate a
release or modification of the servitude. The concern here is that
the holder of a benefit in gross will be difficult to identify and locate
61
This is used in England to circumvent the prohibition on imposing affirmative
burdens by equitable servitudes. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, supra note 22, at 762-65. This
solution might be the appropriate one for party wall covenants.
62
This also is used in England to circumvent the lack of horizontal privity in residential subdivisions. This solution might be appropriate for gasoline supply arrangements and anti-competitive covenants.
63
This solution works for conservation servitudes and homeowners' associations
where the association is to be given power to enforce covenants.
64
English common law recognized only these negative easements. Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land: Part I, 28 VA. L. REV. 951, 959 (1942).
65
In accord with the new Restatement's overall goal of simplifying servitudes, I will
propose eliminating all differences among negative easements, restrictive covenants,
and negative equitable servitudes. I see no reason to retain as a separate device a servitude whose use is limited to providing light, air, support, and water in artificial streams.
66 The anchor parcel may, of course, be exempt from taxation if it is held by a
conservation or historic preservation organization. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE
§ 214 (West 1987).
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and may even disappear. 67 Since acquiring anchor parcels is most
likely to be used in connection with conservation and preservation
servitudes and homeowners' associations, the factual premise that
the benefit holder will be difficult to track down may be
68
questionable.
The second alternative, the lease arrangement, would most
likely be used to facilitate enforcement of covenants to buy the supplies for sale or use on the premises from a particular source. 69 The
concern here is not that the benefit holder may be difficult to locate;
on the contrary, the problem will arise because the benefit holder is
insisting on payment and the holder of the burdened land finds the
price too high. The underlying problem is that the parties' original
bargain has not worked out to provide the expected benefits to the
holder of the burdened parcel. The only advantages I can imagine
of forcing the parties to use a lease are, first, they are more likely
expressly to limit the duration of the covenant obligation, and second, the holder of the benefit will conceivably have more incentive
to be reasonable in negotiating modification or termination.
The third and final avoidance device suggested is that of including a covenant requiring the burdened party to include a similar set
of covenants for the benefit of the covenantee upon any transfer of
the burdened property. The only utility of this form of transaction
is assuring that successors to the burdened land take with knowledge of the obligation-a utility already served by the recording system. The transaction serves to free land from servitude obligations
only if drafters forget to include it or if courts refuse to enforce it. If
such a freeing is desirable, it would seem equally desirable for all
servitudes-or, at least, all affirmative covenants. There is no reason that I can see to limit it to those whose benefits are in gross.
The only significant advantage of using these alternatives instead of the simple covenant with benefit in gross is that they tend to
assure that the benefit holder can be identified. If identifying or lo67 The underlying concern, common to easements, profits, and restrictive covenants, is that the land will become more valuable for a use that is not permitted by the
servitude. Only by modifying or terminating the servitude can alienability and highest
valued use of the land be assured. The assumption is that if the burdened party can
locate the benefited party, they will negotiate to efficient results. This is only one possible outcome of their interaction, however. See Sterk, supra note 12, at 629-30.
68 Current limits on assignability of benefits in gross would also tend to contain the
difficulty of locating benefited parties. However, as I believe these, too, should be eliminated-a subject for another day-I would not rest my case on this point.
69 Since the prohibition on benefits in gross does not apply to covenants not to
compete, I will not discuss the likelihood that a lease arrangement would be used to tie
the benefit to land. The prohibition is seldom applied to supply arrangements either,
but since an occasional court has done so, the lease substitute may be in use. The lack of
recent cases on this subject may indicate that some substitute for the covenant with
benefit in gross is in use.
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cating holders of benefits in gross is likely to be a problem, then less
costly solutions than the current prohibition on benefits in gross
should be available. Equally effective solutions would be providing
parties who want to terminate servitudes with procedural methods
to foreclose the interests of those who cannot be located or requiring periodic filing of a notice of claim to keep in gross servitudes
alive.
The prohibition against benefits in gross arguably performs a
second useful function in those transactions where it operates to
prevent parties who do not own land in the vicinity from enforcing
covenants. In these cases, the prohibition tends to assure that the
plaintiff has a legitimate interest in enforcing the covenant-acting
in effect as a substitute for a standing requirement. This avoids the
need for the plaintiff to show quantifiable damage from a covenant
violation as a prerequisite to enforcement-but it does so only erratically and at too high a cost. A better solution would be simply to
require that a plaintiff holding the benefit of a covenant and seeking
to enforce it show some stake in the outcome of the litigation,
whether that be land ownership in the area or some other interest.
Against these weak advantages of the prohibition on benefits in
gross must be weighed the transaction costs of forcing parties into
the alternative devices and the demoralization costs associated with
frustrating the expectations of parties who mistakenly use benefits
in gross. The danger of the prohibition of in gross benefits is well
illustrated by Minch v. Saymon 70 where the grantor, conveying the
last parcel she owned in the area, imposed restrictions intended to
protect the view from land that she had previously conveyed to her
daughters. The daughters had transferred their land to a family corporation, which then built an apartment house on the land. The
grantor had an interest in the family corporation and lived in the
apartment house. Nevertheless, she was not entitled to enforce her
covenant against a successor to the burdened land because she did
not own land in the vicinity.
My conclusion is that the remnants of the ancient prohibition of
benefits in gross should be eliminated. These prohibitions apply in
too few areas and are too easily circumvented to do much good;
they trap the poorly represented and frustrate expectations; and the
real problems that the limitation tends to solve can be addressed in
less costly and equally (if not more) effective ways.

70

96 N.J. Super. 464, 233 A.2d 385 (Ch. Div. 1967).
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Conclusion: Requirements That Should Continue to
Govern Creation of Servitudes

Following the analysis set forth above, I have concluded that
the remnants of the old categorical controls on servitude creation
can be eliminated without any real loss to the functionality of servitudes law. Having eliminated them, I arrive at the proposition that
all that is required to create a servitude is a contract or conveyance
intended to create a servitude that complies with the Statute of
Frauds. 7' Interests that run with the land can be created in transactions between neighbors and in favor of strangers to the transaction.
Servitude benefits can be held either appurtenant or in gross.
Removal of the old categorical controls does not mean that all
servitudes are valid. Servitude arrangements will still be invalid if
they violate constitutional, statutory, or public policy norms. Nor
does removal of the old controls mean that all servitudes have infinite or uniform duration. What it does mean is that questions of
validity and duration are no longer treated as matters of creation.
Validity questions will be addressed directly in a separate chapter of
the restatement. Duration questions, too, will be addressed directly,
either as matters of interpretation and construction, or as matters of
modification and termination.
This straightforward approach permits substantial simplification of the servitude structure because it renders redundant many of
the traditional categories and permits their elimination.
III
TAXONOMY OF A MODERNIZED LAW OF SERVITUDES

The recognized servitude devices are profits, easements, irrevocable licenses, real covenants, and equitable servitudes. In the following section, I describe the normal use of each and the
characteristics that differentiate them. In several instances, the only
differentiating characteristics are the old doctrines imposing limits
on their creation and use. After weeding out those doctrines, we are
left with profits, easements, restrictive covenants, and affirmative
covenants, which I propose to retain as the basic categories of the
restated law of servitudes.
Profits give someone the right to enter on the land of another
and to remove some physical substance like sand, gravel, soil, timber, or coal. Profits can also be used to create rights for hunting or
fishing and removal of the captured game. Although profits can be
appurtenant to some other interest in land, they are usually held in
71
Of course, the contract or conveyance should also be enforced despite noncompliance with the Statute of Frauds if it falls within an exception to the Statute.
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gross. Profits differ from all other servitudes in authorizing the removal of physical substances from land in the possession of another.
They are always affirmative in that they give rights to make active
use of the land of another.
Easements come in two fundamentally different categories, affirmative and negative. Affirmative easements, like profits, create
rights to make active use of the land of another. The only difference
between affirmative easements and profits is that easements do not
authorize removal of any substance from the land. 72 The first restatement conflated profits with easements because there is no difference in the rules governing them. 7 3 I propose to continue the
use of both terms because it does not cause any. confusion and they
usefully describe rights to do different kinds of things.
Affirmative easements differ from affirmative covenants in that
easements are not used to impose affirmative duties on the holder of
the burdened land7 4 and traditionally require no pivity between the
creating parties. In addition, easement benefits can be held in gross
but cannot be created to benefit third parties. 7 5 If these differences
are eliminated, there are still substantial differences between affirmative easements and affirmative covenants. They are used for quite
different kinds of transactions and they impose quite different kinds
of obligations. These differences are not relevant in terms of creation requirements but may become important in considering questions of succession to burdens 76 and in determining questions of
modification, termination, and remedies.
Negative easements impose restrictions on the uses that can be
made of the burdened land creating rights in the holder of the easement that the land not be developed in violation of the restrictions.
English law limited the purposes for which negative easements
could be created to securing rights to light, air, support, and water
in an artificial stream. 7 7 If those purpose limitations are eliminated,
72 Rights to draw water from the land of another may be classified as easements
even though they involve removal of a substance. Their classification as easements may
reflect the treatment of water as not owned by the land owner. This idea might cause
classification of hunting rights as easements too, rather than as profits.
73 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 450 special note (1944). Easements and
profits may in fact differ in the matter of implication. Easements are much more likely to
be implied from the circumstances of a conveyance, or from the parties' conduct, than
are profits.
74 Easements impose a duty to avoid interfering with the use authorized by the
easement, of course, and easements for common fences and drives may impose duties to
contribute to maintenance but they are not used to impose other kinds of duties.
75 See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text; supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
76 Allocating the burden of performance between present and future interest holders, for example, is resolved differently for easement and covenant burdens.
77 See supra note 64.
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negative easements are functionally identical to both negative covenants and equitable servitudes. Once the artificial constraints on
creating these three devices are eliminated, there is no reason to
continue more than one of them.
Licenses may be used to give rights to make active uses of the
land of another, including the removal of physical substances. They
differ from easements and profits in that they are revocable and,
since they do not create rights or obligations that run with land, they
are not properly considered servitudes. However, under certain circumstances, licenses become irrevocable and do create interests
running with the land. Irrevocable licenses are functionally
equivalent to easements and profits. The only difference between
them is in the manner of their creation. Licenses are usually easements that fail because the parties have not complied with the Statute of Frauds or easements that are implied from a course of
conduct of the parties. They can easily be treated as easement ex78
ceptions to the Statute of Frauds.
Covenants impose obligations on the owner or possessor of
land to do or refrain from doing something. Affirmative covenants
require the land owner or possessor to pay money or to do some
other deed; negative covenants require the land owner and possessor to refrain from doing something on the land. Some covenant
rights may be held in gross. Affirmative covenants differ from profits and affirmative easements in that they burden a land owner with
an affirmative obligation and give their holder the right to receive
performance of the obligation rather than the right to make active
use of the land of another. Negative covenants are functional
equivalents of negative easements imposing use and development
restrictions on the burdened land.
Real covenants differ from all other servitudes because they are
subject to the horizontal privity requirement. The equitable servitude was developed to avoid that requirement so that covenantscould be enforced in equity, even if they lacked horizontal privity.
The equitable servitude is the functional equivalent of a real covenant. The only differences between them (apart from horizontal
privity) are equitable servitudes' more severe limits on benefits in
gross and the possible restriction of equitable servitudes to negative
obligations. If these old creation limitations are eliminated, there is
no reason to continue the category of equitable servitudes.
Affirmative and negative covenants differ from each other to the
78 The durational difference between irrevocable licenses and easements suggested
by RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 519(4) (1944) can be dealt with as a matter of
construction of the duration of easements created by different methods and does not
require continuation of a separate category of servitude.
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same extent as affirmative and negative easements differ. Affirmative covenants impose affirmative burdens on landowners and occupiers, often to pay money or perform obligations that can easily
be reduced to the payment of money. Negative covenants, or restrictive covenants, as they are commonly known, limit the uses that
can be made of the burdened property. Both pose risks to alienability of the land but the risks are different. The affirmative covenant is
often perceived as the more dangerous of the two, and has attracted
more judicial controls in the form of privity requirements and the
touch and concern doctrine. The differences between the two do
not warrant continuing the old privity or touch and concern restrictions on creation of affirmative covenants, but may well warrant different treatment on succession, modification, and termination. The
differences are important enough that I will propose treating affirmative and negative covenants as different categories of servitudes.
The taxonomy that I propose to retain, then, recognizes only
profits, affirmative easements, affirmative covenants, and restrictive
covenants as servitude categories. The irrevocable license, the negative easement, and the equitable servitude will disappear. All of
the remaining servitudes can be either appurtenant or in gross, and
can be created for any purpose which does not violate constitutional, statutory, or public policy norms.

IV
CONCLUSION

The evolution of American servitudes law from reliance on ex
ante controls, like horizontal privity and prohibitions of benefits in
gross, to ex post controls, like notice and changed conditions,
eroded most of the differences among the traditional servitude devices. Recognizing the change that has taken place in American law
allows us to eliminate many of the doctrines limiting servitude creation, which in turn allows us to eliminate as redundant several of the
traditional servitude devices.
The first step in reforming servitudes law has been to clear away
the clutter of the old doctrinal controls, which has left us with four
servitudes: the profit, the affirmative easement, the restrictive covenant, and the affirmative covenant. Although there are differences
among these four that justify their separate labels, the most important fact about them all is what makes them servitudes: they create
rights and obligations that run with interests in land.
The next step is to restructure servitudes law as an integrated
body of doctrine. I have approached this step by treating all four
servitudes as part of a single body of doctrine which occasionally
breaks out one or more of the servitudes for separate treatment.
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Structurally, this means that I have not organized separate chapters
or divisions on the law of profits, easements, and covenants. Instead, I have organized it into chapters on creation, validity, interpretation and construction, succession, and the like.7 9 I have taken

it as a basic principle that a single rule should be stated that would
apply to all servitudes, except where there is something about a particular servitude that justifies applying a different rule.
In developing the chapter on creation, for example, I have proposed stating that all servitudes can be created by conveyance or
contract and that all servitudes are subject to the Statute of Frauds.
Likewise, third parties can be made beneficiaries of any servitude
and all benefits can be held in gross. However, only affirmative
easements and profits can be acquired by prescription. Different
rules, likewise, may apply to finding affirmative easements by implication than apply to profits and different rules apply to implying
negative and affirmative covenants. As we work through the remaining chapters, I expect to take the same approach.8 0
By taking the approach outlined in this Article, we can substantially simplify the doctrinal structure of servitudes law which should
eliminate much of the confusion that has traditionally accompanied
the subject. However, we should not fool ourselves into thinking
that servitudes law will become simple. So long as the judicial system exercises some control over the types of arrangements that can
be made to run with land, and intervenes to modify or terminate
arrangements that have become unfair or uneconomic, the law of
servitudes cannot be simple. The major contribution of the new restatement will be to clear away the old doctrinal tangle and allow us
to focus on the real questions presented by servitude enforcement.
APPENDIX:
SERVITUDES LAw RESTRUCTURED AS AN INTEGRATED BODY

OF DOCTRINE

My current working outline of servitudes law, set forth below, is
in a constant state of evolution. The outline consists of topic head79 My current working outline of servitudes law is included as an Appendix to this
Article.
80
In the succession area, another example of a rule that should not be applied
across the board is the rule that successors to possessory interests are bound by servitudes. A different rule probably is justified for affirmative covenants, at least those calling for the payment of money. The fee owner, rather than the tenant, should probably
be responsible for performance of the covenant, even though the tenant is bound by
profits, easements, and restrictive covenants. The old strict vertical privity doctrine produces this result.
See also Berger, supra, note 18 (discussing other areas where different rules should
apply to different types of servitudes).
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ings which should not be taken as statements of what the law is or
should be.
I. Creation of Servitudes
A. By Contract or Conveyance
B. Intent to Create Servitudes
C. No Horizontal Privity Required
D. Necessary Parties
E. Estates Burdened and Benefited
F. Beneficiaries of Servitudes
G. Required Formalities
H. Failure to Comply with Statute of Frauds
I. Exceptions to Statute of Frauds
J. Creation by Estoppel
K. Implied Creation
1. Prior Use
2. Map or Boundary Reference
3. Reciprocal Servitude
4. Necessity
L. Prescription
1. Rights That Can Be Acquired
2. Use Required
M. Acquisition of Servitudes by the Public
1. Dedication
2. Prescription
3. Condemnation
II. Validity of Servitude Arrangement
A. Constitutional Challenge
1. First Amendment
2. Fourteenth Amendment
3. Right to Privacy
4. Other
B. Statutory Challenge
1. Fair Housing Act
2. Other
C. Public Policy Challenge
1. Undue Restraint on Alienation
2. Undue Restraint on Trade
3. Discrimination
a) Group Homes
b) Children
c) Other
4. Unreasonableness
D. Vagueness
E. Other
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V.

VI.

VII.
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Interpretation and Construction
A. Servitude Interest Intended
1. Appurtenant
2. In Gross
B. Identification of Intended Benefited and Burdened
Parties and Parcels
C. Duration
1. Expressly Created Interests
2. Interests Created by Implication or Estoppel
D. Location, Length, Width
E. Scope or Extent
1. Maintenance Responsibilities
2. Extent of Rights Granted
3. Extent of Rights of Servient Owner
4. Rights to Change Use or Character of Servitude
5. Rights to Change Land Burdened or Benefited by
Servitude
Succession
A. By Succession to Land of Original Party
1. Benefits
2. Burdens
a) Apportionability
(1) Physical Division of Burdened Land
(2) Temporal Division of Ownership (vertical
privity)
B. By Assignment of Benefit
1. Assignability of Benefit
2. Severability of Appurtenant Benefit
3. Divisibility
C. By Assumption of Burden
Modification
A. Amendments to Governing Documents
B. Rule Making by Association Governing Board
C. Assessments
Termination
A. Release
B. Merger
C. Abandonment
D. Severance of Appurtenant Benefit
E. Expiration
F. Statutory Termination
G. Condemnation
H. Prescription Against Servitude Use
Enforcement
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A.
B.

Standing (Interest Required to Enforce Servitude)
Defenses
1. Notice (Recording Act)
2. Statute of Limitations
3. Waiver or Laches
4. Estoppel
5. Misuse of Servitude
6. Changed Conditions
7. Impossibility
8. Frustration of Purpose
9. Obsolescence
C. Remedies
1. Damages
2. Injunction
3. Specific Performance
4. Lien
5. Denial of Privileges of Association Membership
6. Modification
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